

# The Abatement Cost of Methane Emissions from Natural Gas Production

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## **Natural gas for electricity generation:**

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- ▶ Is abundant and cost-competitive with other fuels
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## However, methane (CH<sub>4</sub>):

- ▶ Is itself a greenhouse gas about 30x more potent than CO<sub>2</sub> on a 100-year time horizon
- ▶ 3.2% leakage rate implies no climate advantage over coal  
(Alvarez et al., 2012)
- ▶ 2-6% leakage rates estimated by scientific studies (Sanchez & Mays, 2015)

# This Paper

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## Intuition:

- ▶ Firms choose an optimal level of methane emissions such that  
Marginal Abatement Cost = Marginal Private Benefit = Gas Price

# Background

## Sources of Emissions from Production:

- ▶ Unintentional leaks from extraction, processing, transportation, and storage equipment
- ▶ Intentional venting during completion and maintenance



## **EPA Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP):**

- ▶ Annual estimated methane emissions for over 500 onshore gas production facilities
- ▶ “Facility” is delineated at firm-basin level
- ▶ Six-year panel from 2011-2016
- ▶ Quality issues because methane leakage is hard to measure

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
## **DrillingInfo:**

- ▶ Comprehensive well-level dataset of all oil & gas production in US

## **SNL:**

- ▶ Spot gas prices for 96 geographically-dispersed trading hubs

# Data: GHGRP Facilities



# Empirical Framework

**Fractional Polynomial Model:** Separately estimates all possible combination of  $A$  and  $B$  and selects the best fit for the data

$$R_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_{it}^A + \beta_2 P_{it}^B + \mathbf{X}_{it}\psi + \gamma_i + \lambda_{rt} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

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
$A$  &  $B \equiv$  Fractional polynomial parameters (-2, -1, -0.5, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, log)

$X_{it} \equiv$  Controls (wells, completions, oil production, Colorado post-2014 FE)

$\gamma_i \equiv$  Facility FE



$\lambda_{rt} \equiv$  Region-Year FE (South Central, East, Mountain, Pacific)

# Results: Relationship between Prices and Emission Rates



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Comparison of second-order FP with higher- and lower-order models



# Results: Relationship between Prices and Emission Rates

|                 | Linear                 | 1st-Order FP           | 2nd-Order FP                         | 3rd-Order FP          |
|-----------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| $P_{it}$        | -0.0018***<br>(0.0006) |                        |                                      |                       |
| $\log(P_{it})$  |                        | -0.0061***<br>(0.0017) |                                      |                       |
| $P_{it}^{-0.5}$ |                        |                        |                                      | 0.0493***<br>(0.0168) |
| $P_{it}^{-1}$   |                        |                        | <b>0.0460***</b><br><b>(0.0154)</b>  |                       |
| $P_{it}^{-2}$   |                        |                        | <b>-0.0319***</b><br><b>(0.0123)</b> | -0.0202**<br>(0.0085) |
| $P_{it}^3$      |                        |                        |                                      | 0.00001<br>(0.00001)  |
| Constant        | 0.0127***<br>(0.0025)  | 0.0117***<br>(0.0023)  | <b>-0.0059*</b><br><b>(0.0033)</b>   | 0.0216***<br>(0.0058) |
| $N$             | 1,150                  | 1,150                  | <b>1,150</b>                         | 1,150                 |


Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the parent firm level)

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

All models include facility FE, region-year FE, and controls


Observations weighted by facilities' mean gas production

# Simulation Framework: Effect of a Methane Tax




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- ▷ Start facilities at average emission rates and prices




# Simulation Framework: Effect of a Methane Tax

- ▷ Start facilities at average emission rates and prices
- ▷ Increase prices & decrease emission rates following slope of estimated curve



# Results: Effect of a Methane Tax



# Results: Effect of a Methane Tax

## Predicted Effects at Selected Methane Prices

| <b>Methane Tax</b> | <b>Equiv. CO<sub>2</sub> Price</b> | <b>Total Abatement</b>     | <b>Total Abatement</b> | <b>Total Cost</b> | <b>Value of Recvrd Gas</b> | <b>Net Cost</b>    |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| (\$/Mcf)           | (\$/tCO <sub>2</sub> e)            | (tCO <sub>2</sub> e)       | (Percent)              | (\$ Millions)     | (\$ Millions)              | (\$/Mcf)           |
| 2.79               | 5.00                               | 45,904,000<br>(15,542,000) | 55.7%<br>(23.8)        | 336.7<br>(143.7)  | 265.3<br>(111.6)           | 0.0026<br>(0.0011) |
| 11.18              | 20.00                              | 58,437,000<br>(20,184,000) | 72.0%<br>(33.4)        | 528.3<br>(272.3)  | 336.5<br>(155.7)           | 0.0067<br>(0.0042) |
| 27.37              | 48.97                              | 61,301,000<br>(22,130,000) | 75.5%<br>(36.8)        | 632.6<br>(383.0)  | 353.9<br>(171.5)           | 0.0098<br>(0.0077) |
| <i>N</i>           |                                    | 1,150                      | 1,150                  | 1,150             | 1,150                      | 1,150              |

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses

# Results: Adjusting Simulation Parameters

## Predicted Effects of Fully Internalizing Social Cost (\$27.37/Mcf)

| <b>Model</b>                               | <b>Total Abatement</b><br>(tCO <sub>2</sub> e) | <b>Total Abatement</b><br>(Percent) | <b>Total Cost</b><br>(\$ Millions) | <b>Value of Recvrd Gas</b><br>(\$ Millions) | <b>Net Cost</b><br>(\$/Mcf) |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Base Model                                 | 61,301,000<br>(22,130,000)                     | 75.5%<br>(36.8)                     | 632.6<br>(383.0)                   | 353.9<br>(171.5)                            | 0.0098<br>(0.0077)          |
| Lower-Bounding Rates at 0.1%               | 50,342,000<br>24,819,000                       | 61.6%<br>(30.4)                     | 530.3<br>(321.0)                   | 290.3<br>(142.6)                            | 0.0084<br>(0.0064)          |
| Starting Facilities at 2016 Prices & Rates | 43,179,000<br>(21,989,000)                     | 67.7%<br>(34.5)                     | 341.3<br>(239.7)                   | 178.7<br>(90.7)                             | 0.0057<br>(0.0054)          |
| Using First-Order Fractional Polynomial    | 66,838,000<br>(27,637,000)                     | 81.8%<br>(33.8)                     | 827.5<br>(455.4)                   | 384.7<br>(157.7)                            | 0.0155<br>(0.0108)          |
| <i>N</i>                                   | 1,150  | 1,150                               | 1,150                              | 1,150                                       | 1,150                       |

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses

# Comparison with Other Abatement Cost Estimates

## **This Paper:**

- ▶ \$1.55/tCO<sub>2</sub>e under \$5 carbon tax (average abatement cost)
- ▶ \$4.56/tCO<sub>2</sub>e under \$50 carbon tax

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## **Fowle, Greenstone, and Wolfram (2018):**

- ▶ \$201/tCO<sub>2</sub> for federal Weatherization Assistance Program

# Conclusion

## Summary:

- ▶ Estimated MACC for methane emissions from gas production
- ▶ Predicted 56% abatement under \$5 carbon price
- ▶ Abatement costs relatively low compared to other sectors
- ▶ Natural gas likely to remain competitive under methane regulation

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## Discussion:

- ▶ Efficient area to prioritize for short-term GHG mitigation
- ▶ Implementing methane tax with imperfect/costly monitoring presents significant challenge
- ▶ More economics research on methane leakage needed



Thank You

# Data: Summary Statistics

|                                | Source       | Full Sample |         | Trimmed Sample |        |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|---------|----------------|--------|
|                                |              | Mean        | SD      | Mean           | SD     |
| CH <sub>4</sub> Emissions Rate | GHGRP & DI   | 0.3894      | 4.0953  | 0.0108         | 0.0152 |
| CH <sub>4</sub> Emitted (MMcf) | GHGRP        | 217         | 518     | 266            | 389    |
| From Completions               | GHGRP        | 29          | 169     | 34             | 134    |
| From Equipment                 | GHGRP        | 117         | 276     | 143            | 222    |
| From Maintenance               | GHGRP        | 49          | 110     | 58             | 116    |
| Gas Production (MMcf)          | DrillingInfo | 57,729      | 164,731 | 63,436         | 98,459 |
| Oil Production (Mbbbl)         | DrillingInfo | 4,199       | 10,854  | 4,523          | 10,992 |
| Wells Per Facility             | DrillingInfo | 797         | 1,409   | 879            | 1,489  |
| Completions                    | DrillingInfo | 35          | 73      | 47             | 90     |
| Wholesale Gas Price (\$/Mcf)   | SNL          | 3.23        | 0.83    | 3.20           | 0.85   |
| Number of Facilities           |              | 683         |         | 222            |        |
| Total Observations             |              | 2,980       |         | 1,150          |        |



Mcf  $\equiv$  Thousand cubic feet; MMcf  $\equiv$  Million cubic feet; Mbbbl  $\equiv$  Thousand barrels

# Data: Variation in Prices




# Data: Emissions Rates


Density of emissions rates vs. log emissions rates




# Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Model



# Robustness Check: Unweighted Regression



# Robustness Check: Trimming Emission Rates at 1%



# Results: Abatement Mechanisms

|                           | Low-Bleed<br>Pneumatic<br>Controllers | High-Bleed<br>Pneumatic<br>Controllers | Intermittent<br>Pneumatic<br>Controllers | Pneumatic<br>Pumps | Venting<br>Days    | Gas<br>Recovered<br>For Sales |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| $P_{it}$                  | -78.1<br>(171.5)                      | 0.13<br>(20.11)                        | -380.7*<br>(206.4)                       | -206.0**<br>(86.7) | -6.687<br>(5.893)  | 67,064,000<br>(71,686,000)    |
| Wells                     | 0.331<br>(1.677)                      | 0.0343<br>(0.0434)                     | 1.492<br>(1.038)                         | 0.0665<br>(0.332)  | 0.0124<br>(0.0176) | -4,868<br>(4,852)             |
| Oil (MMbbl)               | -14.91<br>(32.34)                     | 3.481***<br>(1.246)                    | 61.27*<br>(33.01)                        | 17.88<br>(17.17)   | -0.181<br>(0.328)  | -6,722<br>(79,525)            |
| Completions               | 6.291*<br>(3.662)                     | -0.0305<br>(0.0961)                    | -5.930***<br>(2.049)                     | 0.468<br>(0.729)   | 0.0218<br>(0.0403) | -11,509<br>(16,272)           |
| Colorado <sub>2014+</sub> | -459.4<br>(831.1)                     | -26.50<br>(54.30)                      | 861.8<br>(652.2)                         | -211.5<br>(154.3)  | -4.653<br>(5.635)  | 5,201,000<br>(5,609,000)      |
| Facility FE               | Yes                                   | Yes                                    | Yes                                      | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                           |
| Region-Year FE            | Yes                                   | Yes                                    | Yes                                      | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                           |
| $N$                       | 1,055                                 | 1,055                                  | 1,055                                    | 737                | 716                | 716                           |

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the parent firm level)

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$